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Abstract— How can we protect the network infrastructure
from malicious traffic, such as scanning, malicious code prop-
agation, and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks? One
mechanism for blocking malicious traffic is filtering: access
control lists (ACLs) can selectively block traffic based on fields of
the IP header. Filters (ACLs) are already available in the routers
today but are a scarce resource because they are stored in the
expensive ternary content addressable memory (TCAM). In this
paper, we develop, for the first time, a framework for studying
filter selection as a resource allocation problem. Within this
framework, we study five practical cases of source address/prefix
filtering, which correspond to different attack scenarios and
operator’s policies. We show that filter selection optimization
leads to novel variations of the multidimensional knapsack
problem and we design optimal, yet computationally efficient,
algorithms to solve them. We also evaluate our approach using
data from Dshield.org and demonstrate that it brings significant
benefits in practice. Our set of algorithms is a building block
that can be immediately used by operators and manufacturers
to block malicious traffic in a cost-efficient way.
I. INTRODUCTION
How can we protect our network infrastructure from ma-
licious traffic, such as scanning, malicious code propagation,
spam, and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks? These
activities cause problems on a regular basis ranging from
simple annoyance to severe financial, operational and political
damage to companies, organizations and critical infrastructure.
In recent years, they have increased in volume, sophistication,
and automation, largely enabled by botnets that are used as
the platform for launching these attacks.
Protecting a victim (host or network) from malicious traffic
is a hard problem that requires the coordination of sev-
eral complementary components, including non-technical (e.g.
business and legal) and technical solutions (at the application
and/or network level). Filtering support from the network is
a fundamental building block in this effort. For example, the
victim’s ISP may install filters to react to an ongoing attack, by
blocking malicious traffic before it reaches the victim. Another
ISP may want to proactively identify and block the malicious
traffic before it reaches and compromises vulnerable hosts in
the first place. In either case, filtering is a necessary operation
that must be performed within the network.
Filtering capabilities are already available at the routers
today via access control lists (ACLs). ACLs allow a router to
match a packet header against rules [1] and are currently used
for enforcing a variety of policies, including infrastructure
protection [2]. For the purpose of blocking malicious traffic,
a filter is a simple ACL rule that denies access to a source
IP address or prefix. To keep up with the high rates of
modern routers, it is important that filtering is implemented
in hardware: indeed ACLs are stored in the Ternary Content
Addressable Memory (TCAM), which allows for parallel ac-
cess and reduces the number of lookups per forwarded packet.
However, TCAM is more expensive and consumes more space
and power than conventional memory. The size and cost of
TCAM puts a limit on the number of filters and this is not
expected to change in the near future.1 With thousands or tens
of thousands of filters per path, an ISP alone cannot hope to
block the currently witnessed attacks, not to mention attacks
from multimillion-node botnets expected in the near future.
Consider the example shown in Fig.1(a): an attacker com-
mands a large number of compromised hosts to send traffic
towards a victim V (say a webserver), thus exhausting the
resources of V and preventing it from serving its legitimate
clients; the ISP of V tries to protect its client from the attack,
by blocking the attack at the gateway router G. Ideally, G
would like to assign a single filter to block each malicious
IP source. However, there are less filters than attackers and
aggregation is typically used: a single filter blocks an entire
source address prefix. This has the desired effect of reducing
the number of filters but also the side-effect of blocking
legitimate traffic originating from that prefix. Therefore, filter
selection becomes an optimization problem that tries to block
as many malicious and as few legitimate sources as possible,
given a certain budget on the number of filters.
In this paper, we formulate, for the first time, a general
framework for studying filter selection as a resource allocation
problem. To the best of our knowledge, the optimal filter
selection aspect has not been explored so far, as most related
work on filtering has focused on protocol and architectural
aspects. Within this framework, we consider five practical
source address filtering problems, depending on the attack
scenario and the operator’s policy and constraints. Our con-
tributions are twofold. On the theoretical side, filter selection
optimization leads to novel variations of the multidimensional
knapsack problem, and we exploit the special structure of
each problem to design optimal and computationally efficient
algorithms. On the practical side, we provide a set of cost-
1 A router linecard or supervisor-engine card typically supports a single
TCAM chip with tens of thousands of entries. For example, the Cisco Catalyst
4500, a mid-range switch, provides a 64,000-entry TCAM to be shared among
all its interfaces (48- 384). Cisco 12000, a high-end router used at the Internet
core, provides 20,000 entries that operate at line-speed per linecard (up to
4 Gigabit Ethernet interfaces). The Catalyst 6500 switch can fit 16K-32K
patterns and 2K-4K masks in the TCAM. Depending on how an ISP connects
to its clients, each individual client can typically use only part of these ACLs,
i.e. a few hundreds to a few thousands filters.
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Fig. 1. Example of a distributed attack. Let’s assume that the gateway router G has only two filters available to block malicious traffic and protect the victim
V . It uses F1 to block a single malicious address (A) and F2 to block prefix a.b.c.∗, which contains 3 malicious sources but also one legitimate source (B).
Therefore, the selection of filter F2 trades-off the collateral damage (blocking B) for the reduction in the number of filters (from 3 to 1).
efficient algorithms that can be used both by operators to block
malicious traffic and by router manufacturers to optimize the
use of their TCAM and eventually optimize the cost of the
routers. We would like to emphasize that we do not propose a
novel architecture for dealing with malicious traffic; instead,
we optimize the use of an important mechanism that already
exists on the Internet today and can be immediately used as a
building block in larger defense systems, as discussed in detail
in Section V-A.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section II-
A, we formulate the general framework for studying filter
selection. In Section III, we study five specific problems
that correspond to different attack scenarios and operator’s
policies: blocking all addresses in a blacklist (BLOCK-ALL);
blocking some addresses in a blacklist (BLOCK-SOME);
blocking all/some addresses in a time-varying blacklist (TIME-
VARYING BLOCK-ALL/SOME); blocking flows during a
DDoS flooding attack to meet bandwidth constraints (FLOOD-
ING); and distributed filtering across several routers during
flooding (DIST-FLOODING). For each problem, we design an
optimal, yet computationally efficient, algorithm to solve it. In
Section IV, we use data from Dshield.org [3] to evaluate the
performance of our algorithms in realistic attack scenarios and
demonstrate that they bring significant benefit in practice. In
Section V, we position our work within (a) the bigger picture
of defense against malicious traffic and (b) related knapsack
problems. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND FRAMEWORK
A. Definitions and Notation
Let us first define the notation used throughout the paper,
also summarized in Table I.
Source IP addresses and prefixes. Every IPv4 address i is a
32-bit sequence. Using the standard notation IP/mask we use
p/l to denote a prefix p of length l bits; p and l can take values
l = 0, 1, ...32 and p = 0, 1, ...2l − 1 respectively. Sometimes,
for brevity, we will write simply p to indicate prefix p/l. We
write i ∈ p/l to indicate that address i is within the 232−l
addresses covered by prefix p/l.
Blacklists. A blacklist (BL) is a list of N unique malicious
source IP addresses, which send malicious traffic towards the
victim. Identifying which sources are malicious and should be
blocked is a difficult problem on its own right, but orthogonal
to the focus of this paper. We consider that the set of malicious
IP sources is accurately identified by another module (e.g.
an intrusion detection system and/or historical data) in a pre-
processing step and is given as input to our problem. (For a
discussion of these assumptions, see Section V-A.)
An address is considered “bad” if it appears in a blacklist
or “good” if it belongs to a whitelist (a set of legitimate
addresses) G, which may or may not be explicitly given. In
the latter case, G includes all addresses that are not in BL.
Address Weight. In the simplest version of the problem, an
address is simply either bad or good, depending on whether
it appears or not in a blacklist respectively. In a more general
framework, a weight wi can be assigned to every address i
to indicate the importance of an address. We use wi ≤ 0 for
every bad address i to indicate the benefit from blocking it; we
use wi ≥ 0 for every good address i to indicate the collateral
damage from blocking it; wi = 0 indicates indifference about
whether address i will be blocked or not.
The weight wi can have different interpretation depending
on the problem, as we will see later. First, it can capture the
amount of bad/good traffic originating from an IP address and
therefore the benefit/cost of blocking that address. Second, wi
can express policy: e.g. depending on the amount of money
gained/lost by the ISP when blocking address i, the operator
can decide to assign large positive weights to its important
customers that should not be blocked, or large negative weights
to the worst attackers that must be blocked.2
Filters. In this paper, we focus on source address/prefix
filtering. A filter is a simple ACL rule that specifies that all
addresses in prefix p/l should be blocked. Fmax denotes the
maximum number of filters available in TCAM and is given
as input to our problem. Notice that filter optimization is only
meaningful when the number of available filters Fmax is much
2The higher the absolute value of the weight assigned to an individual
bad/good address, the higher preference to block/not block that address. If
all good and bad addresses are assigned the same wg and −wb respectively,
then the ratio wg
wb
is a parameter that the operator can tune to express how
much she values low collateral damage vs. blocked malicious traffic. At the
extreme, wi = ∞ (−∞) indicates that address i must never (always) be
blocked.
3i Generic IP address
wi Weight assigned to address i
BL Blacklist: a list of “bad” addresses
N Number of unique addresses in BL
G Whitelist: a set of “good” addresses
p/l (or “p” for short) prefix p of length l bits (IP/mask notation)
i ∈ p/l address i that belongs to prefix p/l
xp/l ∈ {1, 0} indicates if a filter blocks prefix p/l or not
gp/l =
P
i∈p/l∩G wi collateral damage from filtering prefix p/l
bp/l = |
P
i∈p/l∩B wi| bad traffic blocked by filtering prefix p/l
Fmax Maximum number of available filters
zp(F ) optimal solution of subproblem considering
only addresses in prefix p and F filters
(or zp(F,C)) (and capacity C, in the case of FLOODING)
TABLE I
NOTATION
smaller than the number of malicious sources N , which is
indeed the case in practice (see introduction and [1], [2]).
The decision variable xp/l ∈ {1, 0} is 1 if a filter is assigned
to block prefix p/l; or 0 otherwise. A filter p/l blocks all 232−l
addresses in that range. This has the desired effect of blocking
all bad traffic bp/l = |
∑
i∈p/l∩BL wi| and the side-effect of
blocking all legitimate traffic gp/l =
∑
i∈p/l∩G wi, originating
from that prefix. An effective filter should have a large benefit
bp/l and low “collateral damage” gp/l.
B. Rationale and Overview of Filtering Problems
Given a set of malicious and legitimate sources, and a
measure of their importance (w’s), the goal of filter selection is
the construction of filtering rules, so as to minimize the impact
of malicious sources on the network using the available net-
work resources (e.g. filters and link capacity). Depending on
the attack scenario, and the operator’s policy and constraints,
different problems may arise. E.g. the operator might want to
block all malicious sources, or might tolerate to leave some
unblocked; the attack might be of a low rate or a flooding
attack; the operator may control one or several routers.
In the core of each filtering problem lies the following:
min
∑
p/l
∑
i∈p/l
wi · xp/l (1)
s.t.
∑
p/l
xp/l ≤ Fmax (2)∑
p/l:i∈p/l
xp/l ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ BL (3)
xp/l ∈ {0, 1} ∀l = 0, ..32, p = 0, ..2l (4)
Eq.(1) expresses the objective to minimize the total cost for
the network, which consists of two parts: the collateral damage
(terms with wi > 0) and the cost of leaving malicious traffic
unblocked (terms with wi < 0). We use the notation
∑
p/l to
denote summation over all possible prefixes p/l: l = 0, ...32,
p = 0, ...2l−1. Eq.(2) expresses the constraint on the number
of filters. Eq.(3) states that overlapping filters are mutually
exclusive, i.e. each malicious address should be blocked at
most once, otherwise filtering resources are wasted. Eq.(4)
lists the decision variables xp/l corresponding to all possible
prefixes; it is part of every optimization problem in this paper
and will be omitted from now on for brevity.
Eq.(1)-(4) provide the general framework for filter selection
optimization. Different filtering problems can be written as
special cases within this framework, possibly with additional
constraints. As we discuss in Section V-B, these are all multi-
dimensional knapsack problems [4], which are in general, NP-
hard. The specifics of each problem affect dramatically the
complexity, which can vary from linear to NP-hard.
In this paper, we formulate five practical filtering problems,
and we develop optimal, yet computationally efficient algo-
rithms to solve them. Here, we summarize the rationale behind
each problem and our main results. The exact formulation and
detailed solution for each problem is provided in section III.
[P1] BLOCK-ALL: Assume that a blacklist BL and a
whitelist G is given; a weight is also associated with every
good address to indicate the amount of legitimate traffic
originating from that address. The limit on the number of
filters is Fmax. The first practical goal an operator may have
is to choose a set of filters that block all malicious sources so
as to minimize the collateral damage. We design an optimal
algorithm that solves this problem at low-complexity (linearly
increasing with N , i.e. the lowest achievable complexity for
this problem).
[P2] BLOCK-SOME: Assume that the same blacklist and
whitelist are given, as in P1. However, the operator may be
willing to block only some (instead of all) malicious addresses,
so as to decrease the collateral damage, at the expense of
leaving some malicious traffic unblocked. She can achieve this
by assigning weights wi > 0 and wi < 0 to good and bad
addresses, respectively, to express their relative “importance”.
The goal of P2 is to block only those subsets of malicious
addresses that have the highest impact and are not co-located
with important legitimate sources, so as to minimize the total
cost in Eq.(1). We design an optimal, computationally efficient
(linearly increasing with N ) algorithm for this problem too.
[P3] TIME-VARYING BLOCK-ALL (SOME): Assume
that a set of blacklists {BLT0 ,BLT1 , . . . ,BLTi , . . . }, and a
set of whitelists {GT0 ,GT1 , . . . ,GTi , . . . } are given at different
times, T0 < T1 < · · · < Ti < . . . ; a weight is also
associated with every address; the limit on the number of filters
is Fmax. The goal of P3 is to exploit temporal correlation
between blacklists at successive times and, given the solution
to BLOCK-ALL(SOME) for input blacklist BLTi−1 , to effi-
ciently update the filtering rules and construct the solution to
BLOCK-ALL(SOME) with input blacklist BLTi .
[P4] FLOODING: In a distributed flooding attack, such as
the one shown in Fig.1, a large number of compromised hosts
send traffic to the victim with the purpose of exhausting the
victim’s access bandwidth. The problem is well-known and
increasingly frequent and severe. Our framework can be used
to optimally select filters in this case, so as to minimize the
collateral damage and meet the bandwidth constraint (i.e. the
total bandwidth of the unblocked traffic should not exceed the
bandwidth of the flooded link, e.g. link G-V in Fig.1). The
4
input is the same as in P1-P2, and the weights capture the
traffic volume originating from each IP source. We prove that
the problem P4 is NP-hard and we design a pseudo-polynomial
algorithm that optimally solve problem P4 with complexity
that grows linearly with the number of sources in the blacklist
and the whitelist |BL|+ |G|.
[P5] DIST-FLOODING: All the above problems aim at
selecting filters at a single router. However, a network ad-
ministrator, of an ISP or campus network, may use the
filtering resources collaboratively across several routers to
better defend against an attack. (Distributed filtering may also
be enabled by the cooperation across several ISPs against a
common enemy.) The question then is not only which filters
to select but also on which router to place them. Here, we
focus on DIST-FLOODING, which is the practical case of
distributed filtering, across several routers, against a flooding
attack. We prove that P5 can be decomposed into several
FLOODING problems, that can be solved independently and
optimally one at each router.
III. FILTERING PROBLEMS AND ALGORITHMS
In this section, we give the detailed formulation of each
problem and the algorithm that solves it. But first, let us define
a data structure that we use to represent the problem and to
develop all the subsequent algorithms.
A. Data Structure for Representing the Problem
Definition 1 (LCP Tree): Given a set A of N IP addresses,
we define the Longest Common Prefix tree of A, LCP(A),
as the binary tree whose leaves represent the N IPs and all
other nodes represent all and only the longest common prefixes
between any pair of IPs in A. The prefixes are organized
in the natural IP hierarchy, with shorter prefixes towards
the root and longer prefixes towards the leaves, so that the
prefix corresponding to a parent node includes the prefixes
corresponding to its two children.
An example is shown and discussed in Fig.2.
The LCP tree can be constructed from the binary tree of all
prefixes, by removing the branches that do not have malicious
IPs and then by removing nodes with a single child. It reduces
the storage for representing candidate prefixes by encoding
those prefixes that are part of a feasible solution. The LCP
tree is a variation of the binary (unibit) trie [5] but does not
have nodes with a single child. We do not claim novelty in
this data structure but we describe it in detail because we use
it extensively in the design of the algorithms.
Complexity: We can build the LCP tree from N malicious
addresses by performing N insertions in a Patricia trie [5].
To insert a string of m bits, we need at most m comparisons.
Thus, the worst case complexity is O(mN), where m = 32
(bits) is the constant length of an IP address.
We will make extensive use of the LCP tree in all algorithms
in the rest of this section, as it provides a compact way to
represent feasible solutions and to efficiently select the optimal
one. Note that every node in the LCP-tree is a candidate prefix
p/l; for brevity of notation, we will use interchangeably the
notation p/l and its shorter version p.
Fig. 2. Example of LCP-tree used in BLOCK-ALL. For ease
of illustration, consider a 4-bit (instead of 32-bit) address space,
i.e. from 0000 to 1111. Let BL = {0, 3, 4, 5, 7, 810, 11, 12} be the
set of malicious IPs, corresponding to the leaves of the binary tree.
All remaining IPs (1, 2, 6, 9, 13, 14, 15) are considered legitimate and
not explicitly shown. Every intermediate node represents the longest
common prefix (LCP) covering all malicious sources in that subtree;
it is associated with a cost measuring the additional collateral damage
caused when we filtering that node, instead of filtering each of its
children. E.g. the LCP of malicious addresses 0=0000 and 3=0011 is
prefix 00**; if filter 00** is chosen instead of filters 0000 and 0011,
collateral damage of 2 is caused, because the legitimate addresses 1
and 2 are also blocked. Choosing a set of source prefixes to filter is
equivalent to choosing a set of nodes in this LCP tree. E.g. a feasible
solution to BLOCK-ALL consists of prefixes {0/2, 4/2, 8/2, 12/4}
that cover all malicious IPs.
B. BLOCK-ALL
Goal. Given: (i) a blacklist of malicious addresses BL
(ii) a set of legitimate sources (iii) weights assigned to each
legitimate source address, indicating the amount of traffic from
that address and (iv) a limit on the number of filters Fmax;
select source address prefixes so as to block all malicious
sources and minimize the collateral damage.
Formulation. This can be formulated within the general
framework of Eq.(1)-(4) by assigning wi > 0 to good
addresses (the amount of legitimate traffic) and weight wi = 0
to each malicious source. The goal is to minimize the total
cost, which in this case is simply the total legitimate traffic
blocked:
∑
p/l
∑
i∈p/l wi · xp/l =
∑
i∈p/l∩G wi + 0 = gp/l.
Constraint Eq.(7) enforces that every malicious source should
be blocked by exactly one filter.
min
∑
p/l
gp/lxp/l (5)
s.t.
∑
p/l
xp/l ≤ Fmax (6)∑
p/l:i∈p/l
xp/l = 1 ∀i ∈ BL (7)
Characterizing an Optimal Solution. In the algorithm, we
search for solutions that can be represented as a subtree of the
LCP tree structure, as described in the following:
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Proposition 3.1: Given BL and Fmax, there exists an op-
timal solution of BLOCK-ALL that can be represented as a
pruned subtree of LCP-tree(BL) with: the same root, up to
Fmax leaves, and non-leaf nodes having exactly two children.
Proof: We prove that every feasible solution of BLOCK-
ALL can be reduced to another feasible solution that (i)
corresponds to a subtree of LCP-tree(BL) as described in the
proposition and (ii) has smaller or equal collateral damage.
This is sufficient to prove the Prop.3.1 since an optimal
solution is also a feasible one.
Clearly, every feasible solution of Eq. (5)-(7), S, can be
represented as a pruned subtree of the binary tree of all
possible IP prefixes, with the same root and leaves being the
prefixes used as filters. Assume that S uses a prefix p˜/l˜ which
is not in LCP-tree(BL). Therefore, either p˜/l˜ does not contain
any bad IPs or one of its two branches does not. In fact, if
this was not the case, i.e. there is at least one bad IP in both
branches, then p˜/l˜ would be the longest common prefix of
them, and as such it would be in LCP-tree(BL).
If there are no bad IPs in prefix p˜/l˜, then we can safely
remove the filter p˜/l˜, as it is not blocking any bad IPs.
Similarly, if bad IPs are concentrated only in one of the two
branches, then we can move the filter from p˜/l˜ to its child
that contains all bad IP(s).
In both cases, we have a constructed a new feasible solution,
with smaller (or equal) collateral damage than the original
solution. Iterating this process until all prefixes are in the LCP-
tree shows that any feasible solution can be transformed in a
feasible solution corresponding to a subtree of LCP-tree(BL),
as described in the proposition and having smaller or equal
collateral damage. Therefore, also an optimal feasible solution
can be transformed to that form.
Finally, we note that every node of the subtree so con-
structed, has two (or zero) children node. By contradiction,
a set of filters which can be represented as a subtree of the
LCP-tree with (at least) one node p with exactly one child
node, correspond to leaving unfiltered all bad IPs contained in
the child node (prefix) of p which is not selected in the subtree.
3 This violates constraint in Eq.(7), and thus correspond to a
non-feasible solution of problem BLOCK-ALL.
Algorithm. Algorithm 1, which solves BLOCK-ALL, con-
sists of two main steps. First, we build the LCP-tree from the
input blacklist. Second, in a bottom-up fashion, we compute
zp(F )∀p, F , i.e. the minimum collateral damage needed to
block all malicious IPs in the subtree of prefix p using
at most F filters. Following a dynamic programming (DP)
formulation, we can find the optimal allocation of filters in the
subtree rooted at prefix p, by finding a value n and assigning
F − n filters to the left subtree and n to the right subtree, so
as to minimize the collateral damage. The fact that we need to
filter all malicious addresses (leaves in the LCP tree) implies
that at least one filter must be assigned to the left and right
subtree, i.e. n = 1, 2..., F − 1.
3note that in the LCP-tree every node/prefix contain at least one bad IP.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for BLOCK-ALL
1: build LCP-tree(BL)
2: for all leaf nodes leaf do
3: zleaf (F ) = 0 ∀F ∈ [1, Fmax]
4: Xleaf (F ) = {leaf} ∀F ∈ [1, Fmax]
5: end for
6: level = level(leaf)-1
7: while level ≥ level(root) do
8: for all node p such that level(p)==level do
9: zp(1) = gp
10: Xp(1) = {p}
11: zp(F ) = minn=1,..F−1
n
zsl (F − n) + zsr (n)
o
∀F ∈
[2, Fmax]
12: Xp(F ) = Xsl (F − n) ∪Xsr (n)∀F ∈ [2, Fmax]
13: end for
14: level = level - 1
15: end while
16: Return zroot(Fmax), Xroot(Fmax)
For every pair of sibling nodes, sl (left) and sr (right), with
common parent node p, we have the DP recursive equation:
zp(F ) = min
n=1,...,F−1
{
zsl(F − n) + zsr (n)
}
, F > 1 (8)
with boundary conditions for leaf and intermediate nodes:
zleaf (F ) = 0 ∀F ≥ 1, zp(1) = gp ∀p (9)
Once we compute zp(F ) for all prefixes in the LCP-tree, we
simply read the value of the optimal solution, zroot(Fmax).
We also use the variables Xp(F ) to keep track of the set of
prefixes used in the optimal solution. In lines (4) and (10) of
Algorithm 1, Xp(F ) is initialized to the single prefix used. In
line (12), after computing the new cost, the corresponding set
of prefixes is updated: Xp(F ) = Xsl(F − n) ∪Xsr (n).
Theorem 3.2: Alg.1 computes the optimal solution of prob-
lem BLOCK-ALL: the prefixes that are contained in set
Xp(F ) are the optimal xp/l = 1 for Eq.(5)-(7).
Proof: Recall, zroot(Fmax) denote the value of the opti-
mal solution of BLOCK-ALL with Fmax filters (i.e. minimum
amount of collateral damage), and with Xroot(Fmax) the set
of filters selected in the optimal solution. Let sl and sr denote
the two children nodes (prefixes) of root in the LCP-tree(BL).
Finding the optimal allocation of Fmax > 1 filters to block all
IPs contained in root (possibly the all IP space), is equivalent
to finding the optimal allocation of x ≥ 1 filters to block all
IPs in sl, and y ≥ 1 prefixes for bad IPs in sr, such that
x + y = Fmax. This is because prefixes sl, and sr jointly
contain all bad IPs. Moreover, both sl and sr contains at least
one bad IP. Thus, at least one filter must be assigned to each
of them. If Fmax = 1, i.e. there is only one filter available, the
only feasible solution is to select root as the prefix to filter out.
The same argument recursively applies to descendant nodes,
until either we reach a leaf node, or we have only one filter
available. In these cases, the problem is trivially solved by
condition in Eq.(9).
Complexity. Computing Eq.(8) for every node p and for
every F ∈ [1, Fmax− 1] involves N(Fmax− 1) subproblems,
one for every pair (p, F ) with complexity Fmax − 1 each.
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zp(F ) in Eq.(8) requires only the optimal solution at the
sibling nodes, z(sl, F − n), z(sr, n). Thus, proceeding from
the leaves to the root, we can compute the optimal solution
in N(Fmax − 1)2. This simple bound can be made tighter
observing that, at every node in the LCP-tree we do not
need to compute zp(F ) for all values F ≤ Fmax, but only
for F ≤ min{|leaves(p)|, Fmax}, where |leaves(p)| is the
number of the leaves under prefix p in the LCP tree. Moreover,
the complexity of computing every single entry zp(F ) is
obviously F . Thus, the overall number of operations needed
equals,
∑
i∈Node
∆i(∆i + 1)
2
(10)
where ∆i = min{Fmax, |leaves(i)|}. Let Li denote the
level of node i in the LCP-tree, with the convention that we
assign L = 0 to the root node. Per every node, such that Li ≤
blog ( NFmax )c, ∆i = Fmax; otherwise, ∆i = |leaves(i)| ≤
N
2Li
, since LCP-tree is a binary tree. Thus, we have
dlogNe∑
L=0
∑
i∈Node
level(i)=L
∆i(∆i + 1)
2
=
=
⌊
log
(
N
Fmax
)⌋∑
L=0
∑
i∈Node
level(i)=L
Fmax(Fmax + 1)
2
+
+
dlogNe∑
L=
⌊
log
(
N
Fmax
)⌋
+1
∑
i∈Node
level(i)=L
N
2Li
( N
2Li
+ 1
)
=
=
⌊
log
(
N
Fmax
)⌋∑
L=0
∑
i∈Node
level(i)=L
Fmax(Fmax + 1)
2
+
+
dlogNe∑
L=
⌊
log
(
N
Fmax
)⌋
+1
∑
i∈Node
level(i)=L
N2
22Li
+
N
2Li
≤ (2log
(
N
Fmax
)
+1 − 1)Fmax(Fmax + 1)
2
+
+
Fmax
2
(Fmax
2
+ 1
)
(11)
≤ N (Fmax + 1)
2
+
Fmax
2
(Fmax
2
+ 1
)
where Eq.(11) uses the fact that if 0 ≤ n0 < n1, then∑n1
h=n0
1
2h
≤ 1
2n0−1 .
Using this observation, the computation can be done in
O(NFmax), which is essentially O(N), since Fmax << N
and Fmax does not depend on N but only on the TCAM size.
Thus, the time complexity increases linearly with the number
of malicious IPs N . This is the lowest achievable complexity,
within a constant factor, since we need to read all N malicious
IPs at least once.
C. BLOCK-SOME
Goal. Given: (i) a blacklist of malicious addresses (ii) a set
of legitimate sources (iii) weights assigned to all addresses,
which express relative importance and (iv) a limit on the
number of filters Fmax; select some source address prefixes
to block so as to minimize the total cost, including the cost
of collateral damage and the benefit of blocking malicious
addresses.
Formulation. This can be formulated within the general
framework of Eq.(1)-(4), by assigning to good and bad ad-
dresses weights wi > 0 and wi < 0 respectively, to express
their relative importance. The goal is to minimize the total
cost, as in Eq.(1), which in this case includes both collateral
damage gp/l and unfiltered malicious traffic bp/l.
min
∑
p/l
(
gp/l − bp/l
)
xp/l (12)
s.t.
∑
p/l
xp/l ≤ Fmax (13)∑
p/l:i∈p/l
xp/l ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ BL (14)
Another difference from BLOCK-ALL is Eq.(14), which dic-
tates that every malicious source must be covered at most by
one prefix, but does not necessarily have to be covered.
Characterizing an Optimal Solution. We can leverage again
the structure of the LCP tree to characterize feasible and
optimal solutions, with a proposition similar to Prop.3.1. The
difference from BLOCK-ALL is that, because some bad IPs
can remain unfiltered, the pruned subtree corresponding to a
feasible solution can now have nodes with a single descendant.
Proposition 3.3: Given BL and Fmax, there exists an op-
timal solution of BLOCK-SOME that can be represented as
a pruned subtree of LCP-tree(BL) with: the same root, up to
Fmax leaves.
Proof: In Prop.3.1 we proved that any solution of Eq.5-
6 can be reduced to a (pruned) subtree of the LCP-tree with
at most Fmax leaves. Moreover, we note that constraint in
Eq.(14), which imposes the use of non-overlapping prefixes,
is automatically imposed considering the leaves of the pruned
subtree as the selected filter. This prove that any feasible
solution of BLOCK-SOME can be transformed in a pruned
subtree of the LCP-tree with at most Fmax leaves. And thus,
can an optimal solution.
Algorithm. The algorithm is similar to Algorithm 1 in that it
uses the LCP-tree and a similar DP approach. The difference
is that not all addresses need to be covered and, at each step,
we can assign n = 0 filters to the left or right subtree, i.e. in
line (11) of Algorithm 1: n = 0, 1..., F . We can recursively
compute the optimal solution as before:
zp(F ) = min
n=0,...,F
{
zsl(F − n) + zsr (n)
}
(15)
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with boundary conditions for intermediate (p) and leaf nodes:
zp(0) = 0 ∀ p (16)
zp(1) = min
{
gp − bp, min
n=0,1
{
zsl(1− n) + zsr (n)
}}
(17)
zleaf (F ) = −bleaf ∀F ≥ 1 (18)
Complexity. The analysis of BLOCK-ALL can be applied
to this algorithm as well. The complexity turns out to be the
same, i.e. linearly increasing in N as well.
BLOCK-ALL vs. BLOCK-SOME. There is an interesting
connection between the two problems. The latter can be
regarded as an automatic way to select the best subset from
BL, in terms of the weights wi, and run BLOCK-ALL only
on that subset. The advantage is that we do not need to search
for the optimal subset, which is automatically given in the
final solution. In the extreme case that much more importance
is given to the bad rather than the good addresses, BLOCK-
SOME degenerates to BLOCK-ALL.
D. TIME-VARYING BLOCK-ALL(SOME)
So far, we have considered the static problem of filter-
ing a fixed set of source IP addresses. However, malicious
source IPs appear/disappear/reappear in a blacklist over time
[9]. In this section, we consider the problem of filtering a
dynamic set of source IPs, i.e., varying over time. This is
equivalent to considering different blacklists, one at every
time an IP is inserted or deleted from the blacklist. Let
us denote {BLT0 ,BLT1 , . . . ,BLTi , . . . } the set of different
blacklists as sampled at time T0 < T1 < · · · < Ti < . . . ,
when a new IP is inserted in the blacklist or an old one is
removed. The trivial approach to the dynamic BLOCK-ALL
problem is to run Alg.1 from scratch at every time instance. As
noted the computational complexity of Alg.1 is low: it grows
linearly with the number of IP addresses in the blacklist, N .
However, if the overlap between two successive blacklists is
large enough, we can exploit the correlation between them
to construct a more efficient scheme, which updates filters
as needed, while leaving most of them unchanged. More
formally, consider the following problem:
Goal. Given a set of blacklists
{BLT0 ,BLT1 , . . . ,BLTi , . . . } collected at different times,
T0 < T1 < · · · < Ti < . . . , and Fmax filters, find the set
of filtering rules {ST0 ,ST1 , . . . ,STi , . . . } at every time such
that, ∀i = 0, 1, ... ST〉 solves BLOCK-ALL(SOME) for input
blacklist BLTi .
Algorithm. As mentioned above, if there is no or low overlap
between successive blacklists, the obvious solution to this
problem is to run the BLOCK-ALL algorithm at every time
a new blacklist is provided. Otherwise, if only few IPs are
inserted/removed from a blacklist to the successive one, we
can update all and only the filters affected by that change.
For example, consider two blacklists, BLTi−1 ,BLTi , which
differ only in a single new IP inserted in BLTi . Assume
that STi−1 , the solution to the BLOCK-ALL problem with
blacklist BLTi−1 , has already been computed. We want to find
an efficient algorithm that computes STi .
Fig. 3. As an example, assume having a 6-bits IP space, instead of the usual
32 bits. A new IP, corresponding to 37 in decimal notation, is inserted in the
blacklist made up of IPs: 3,10,15,17,22,31,32,33,57,58. Its insertion requires
that all and only its predecessor nodes in the LCP-tree are updated according
to Eq.(8) (or Eq.(15) if we are running BLOCK-SOME). Moreover, a new
node, in gray, is created to denote the longest common prefix between 37 and
32 (or 33). Note that, all other nodes corresponding to the longest common
prefixes between 37 and other IPs in the blacklist, is already in the initial
LCP-tree.
Basically, there are to two separate cases depending on
whether or not the new IP is covered by some prefix which
is already filtered in STi−1 . If this is the case, no further
action is needed, and STi = STi−1 . Otherwise, we need to
modify the filters to also cover the new IP. An efficient way
to do so, is illustrated in Fig.3. When a new IP appears in
the blacklist, only one intermediate node needs to be added to
the LCP-tree: the one corresponding to the longest common
prefix between the new node the and its “closest” IP already
in the blacklist (gray node in Fig.3). As learnt from the
previous sections, an optimal allocation of f filters at prefix
p/l, depends only on how these f filters are allocated to the
children nodes of p in the LCP-tree. Thus, the insertion of
a new IP in the blacklist requires only the re-computation
of zp(f) and Xp(f)∀f , through Eq.(8), for all and only the
predecessors of the new node in the LCP-tree (nodes along the
dashed path in Fig.3). Multiple insertions can be handled by
iterating the above procedures for every insertion. Handling
removal operations (i.e. IPs that are removed from a blacklist)
is similar: when removing an IP, we also remove its parent
node, since it stops being the longest common prefix of two
IPs, and we update all other predecessor nodes according to
Eq.(8).
We note that since any LCP-tree is also a binary tree, there
are at most log(N) predecessors of any leaf node, thus the
above procedure requires O(log(N)Fmax) operations. This
is a more efficient update scheme, than running Alg.1 from
scratch, if and only if the number of insert/remove operations
that need to be performed to obtain BLTi from the previous
blacklist, BLTi−1 , is less than NlogN . Otherwise it is less
expensive to simply run Alg.1 with input the new blacklist,
BLTi .
Finally, we note that we can use the same approach to solve
the dynamic BLOCK-SOME problem. In that case as well,
arrivals/departures of malicious addresses from the blacklist
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can be handled by insertions/deletions in/from the LCP-tree;
the filters should be updated accordingly so that they provide
an optimal solution to the static BLOCK-SOME problem for
the input blacklist at every time.
E. FLOODING
Goal. Given: (i) a blacklist of malicious addresses (ii) a
set of legitimate sources (ii) the amount of traffic that each
generates (iii) a limit on the number of filters Fmax and
(iv) a constraint on the link capacity (bandwidth) C; select
some source address prefixes to block so as to minimize the
collateral damage and make the total traffic fit within the link
capacity.
Formulation.
min
∑
p/l
gp/lxp/l (19)
s.t.
∑
p/l
xp/l ≤ Fmax (20)∑
p/l
(
gp/l + bp/l
)
(1− xp/l) ≤ C (21)∑
p/l:i∈p/l
xp/l ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ BL (22)
where, gp/l and bp/l denote the amount of good bad traffic
from prefix p/l, respectively. Eq.(22) indicates that we are
interested in blocking some, not all, malicious sources, and
that we should not use overlapping prefixes. Before the attack,
the total good traffic t0 =
∑
p/l
(
gp/l + bp/l
)
could fit
within the capacity; after flooding, the total traffic exceeds
the capacity. Eq.(21) says that the total traffic that remains
unblocked after filtering should fit within the link capacity C.
Characterizing an Optimal Solution. We use the LCP tree
for all addresses BL∪G. Furthermore, to account for Eq.(21),
we assign a cost, tp, to every node in the LCP tree, represent-
ing the total traffic generated by prefix p/l, tp = gp + bp.
Proposition 3.4: Given BL, G, Fmax, and C, there exists
an optimal solution of the FLOODING problem that can be
represented as a pruned subtree of LCP(BL ∪ G), with the
same root, up to Fmax leaves, and s.t. the total cost of the
leaves be ≥ t0 − C.
Proof: The proof is along the same guideline of Prop.3.1.
It can be shown that every feasible solution of FLOODING,
S, can be mapped in another feasible solution, S′, which i)
correspond to a subtree of LCP-tree(BL ∪ G) as described in
Prop.3.4, and ii) whose collateral damage is smaller or equal
to the collateral damage of S.
To see this, assume S uses a prefix p˜/l˜, which is in not in
LCP-tree(BL ∪ G). There cannot be good or bad sources in
each of the two siblings prefixes, p˜/(l˜+1). If this was the case,
p˜/l˜ would be their longest common prefix, and consequently
it would appear in LCP-tree(BL ∪ G).
Thus, there are two cases: If p˜/l˜ does not include any good
or source we can simply remove it; otherwise we can filter
only the branch that has some sources. Since the removed
branch does not have active sources, the obtained solution is
still feasible and the overall collateral damage is not increased
(we are filtering a subset of what was already filtered). Iterating
this process until all prefixes are in LCP-tree(BL ∪ G), prove
that any feasible solution can be interpreted as a subtree of the
LCP-tree, where the leaves are the actual filters used. Thus,
also an optimal feasible solution can be represented in this
way.
Finally, we have that, in order to have the allowed traffic
within the capacity C, the filtered traffic, represented by the
sum of costs tp at the subtree leaves, must be greater of equal
than t0 − C.
Algorithm. FLOODING is a 2-dimensional knapsack prob-
lem (2KP), with an additional capacity constraint, Eq.(22),
that makes it harder. 2KP is a “very hard” problem: not only
it is NP-Hard, but also the existence of a full polynomial time
approximation scheme for this problem is unlikely to exist,
since it would imply that P = NP [6]. For FLOODING we
obtain the following hardness result:
Theorem 3.5: The optimization problem FLOODING, in
Eq.(19)-(22), is NP-Hard.
Proof: It is obvious that FLOODING is in NP . To prove
that it is also NP-hard, we consider the KP problem with a
cardinality constraint:
max
∑
i∈I
pixi, s.t.
∑
i∈I
wixi ≤ C1 and
∑
i∈I
xi = k (23)
which is known to be NP-hard [4], and we show that it
reduces to FLOODING. First, note that any solution of the
above problem that uses F < Fmax filters can be transformed
to another feasible solution with exactly Fmax filters, without
increasing the collateral damage.4 Therefore, the inequality in
Eq.(20) can be replaced by an equality without affecting the
collateral damage of the optimal solution. Second, we define
x¯p/l = 1 − xp/l, F¯max =
(∑
p/l 1
)
− Fmax and we rewrite
the above problem:
max
∑
p/l
gp/lx¯p/l s.t. :
∑
p/l
x¯p/l = F¯max, (24)∑
p/l
(
gp/l + bp/l
)
x¯p/l ≤ C,
∑
p/l:i∈p/l
x¯p/l ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ BL
(25)
For a given instance of Problem (23), we construct an equiva-
lent instance of Problem (24)-(25) by introducing the follow-
ing mapping. For i = 1, . . . , N : −g¯ii = pi, (gii + bii) = wi.
For p/l that is not in the blacklist: g¯p/l = 0 and (gp/l+bp/l) =
C+1. Moreover, we assign F¯max = k and C = C1. With this
assignment a solution to the KP problem (23) can be obtained
by solving FLOODING and then taking the values of variables
xp/l s.t p/l is in the blacklist.
Therefore, we do not to look for a polynomial time
algorithm. Instead, we designed a pseudo-polynomial time
4This can be proved using the LCP-tree structure. Given a solution, S,
with F < Fmax filters, (until F < N ) there exist always a filter that can be
replaced by two filters, corresponding its children. The solution constructed
in such a way has F +1 filters, keeps on blocking all IPs blocked in S, and
has value less or equal than the value of S.
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algorithm that optimally solves FLOODING, and whose com-
plexity grows linearly with the number of active sources (either
good or bad).
Let zp(F, c) be the minimum collateral damage solving
FLOODING problem with F filters and capacity c:
zp(F, c) = min
n=0,...,F
m=0,...,c
{zsl(F − n, c−m) + zsr (n,m)} (26)
Complexity. The DP approach computes O(CFmax) entries
for every node. Moreover, the computation of a single entry,
given the entries of descendant nodes, require O(CFmax)
operations, Eq.(26). We can leverage again the observation
that we do not need to compute CFmax entries for all nodes
in the LCP tree. At a node p, it is sufficient to compute
Eq.(26) only for c = 0, ..., C˜ = min{C,∑i∈p/l wi} ≤ C and
f = 0, ..., F˜ . Therefore, the optimal solution to FLOODING,
zroot(Fmax, C), can be computed in O((N + |G|)C2) time.
The algorithm has pseudo-polynomial complexity since it is
polynomial in C that cannot be bounded by the input length.
More importantly, its complexity increases linearly with the
number of IP sources in BL ∪ G.
FLOODING vs. BLOCK-SOME. To see the connection
between FLOODING and BLOCK-SOME, let us consider a
partial Lagrangian relaxation of (19)-(22):
max
λ≥0
{
min
∑
p/l
[
(1− λ)gp/l − λbp/l
]
xp/l+ (27)
+
∑
p/l
λ(gp/l + λbp/l)− λC
}
s.t.
∑
p/l
xp/l ≤ Fmax (28)∑
p/l:i∈p/l
xp/l ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ BL (29)
For every fixed λ ≥ 0 problem (27)-(29) is equivalent to (19)-
(22) for a specific assignments of weights wi. This shows
that dual feasible solutions of FLOODING are instances of
BLOCK-SOME for a particular assignment of weights. The
dual problem, in the variable λ, aims exactly at tuning the
Lagrangian multiplier to find the best assignment of weights.5
F. DIST(RIBUTED)-FLOODING
Goal: Consider a victim V that connects to the Internet
through its ISP and is flooded by a set of attackers (listed
in a blacklist BL), as in Fig.1(a). To reach the victim, attack
traffic has to pass through one or more ISP routers; let R be
the set of unique routers from some attacker to the victim. Let
5Problem (27)-(29) can be solved in a standard way with a projected
subgradient method [4]
x
(k)
p/l
= x∗p/l(λ
(k)), ∀p, l (30)
λ(k+1) =
ˆ
λ(k) + αk
`
(fg
p/l
+ fbp/l)(1− x(k)p/l)− C
´˜+ (31)
where, x(k)
p/l
is the kth iteratation, x∗
p/l
(λ(k)) is the optimal solution of (27)-
(29) for λ = λ(k), αk > 0 is the kth step size, and [·]+ indicates the
projection over the set of non-negative numbers.
each router u ∈ R have capacity C(u) on the downstream link
(towards V ) and a limited number of filters F (u)max. We assume
that the volume of good/bad traffic through every router is
known. Our goal is to allocate filters across all routers, in a
distributed way, so as to minimize the total collateral damage
and avoid congestion on all links of the ISP network.
Formulation. Let the variables x(u)p/l ∈ {0, 1} indicate
whether or not filter p/l is used at router u. Then the
distributed filtering problem can be stated as:
min
∑
u∈R
∑
p/l
g
(u)
p/lx
(u)
p/l (32)
s.t.
∑
p/l
x
(u)
p/l ≤ F (u)max ∀u ∈ R (33)
∑
p/l
(
g
(u)
p/l + b
(u)
p/l
)
(1− x(u)p/l) ≤ C(u) ∀u ∈ R (34)∑
u∈R
∑
p/l3i
x
(u)
p/l ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ BL (35)
Characterizing an Optimal Solution. Given the sets BL, G,
R, and F (u)max, C(u) at each router, we have:
Proposition 3.6: There exists an optimal solution of DIST-
FLOODING that can be represented as a set of |R| different
pruned subtrees of the LCP-tree(BL∪G), each corresponding
to a feasible solution of FLOODING for the same input, and
s.t. every subtree leaf is not a node of another subtree.
Proof. Feasible solutions of DIST-FLOODING allocate fil-
ters on different routers s.t. Eq.(33) and (34) are satisfied
independently at every router. In the LCP tree, this means
having |R| subtrees, one for every router, each having at most
F
(u)
max leaves and associated blocked traffic ≥ t(u)0 − C(u),
where t(u)0 is the total incoming traffic at router u. Each
subtree on its own can be thought as a feasible solution of a
FLOODING problem. Eq.(35) ensures that the same address
is not filtered multiple times at different routers, to avoid
redundant waste of filters. In the LCP-tree, this translates into
every leaf of the different subtree appearing at most in one
subtree. 
Algorithm. Constraint (35), which imposes that different
routers do not block the same prefixes, prevents us from a
direct decomposition of the problem. To decouple the problem,
consider the following partial Lagrangian relaxation:
L(x, λ) =
∑
u∈R
∑
p/l
g
(u)
p/lx
(u)
p/l +
∑
i∈BL
λi
(∑
u∈R
∑
p/l3i
x
(u)
p/l − 1
)
=
∑
u∈R
(∑
p/l
(
g
(u)
p/l + λp/l
)
x
(u)
p/l
)
−
∑
i∈BL
λi (36)
where λi is the Lagrangian multiplier (price) for the constraint
in Eq.(35), and λp/l =
∑
i∈p/l λi is the price associated with
prefix p/l. With this relaxation, both the objective function
and the other constraints immediately decompose in |R|
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independent sub-problems, one per router u:
min
∑
p/l
(
g
(u)
p/l + λp/l
)
x
(u)
p/l (37)
s.t.
∑
p/l
x
(u)
p/l ≤ F (u)max (38)∑
p/l
(
g
(u)
p/l + b
(u)
p/l
)
(1− x(u)p/l) ≤ C(u) (39)
The dual problem is:
max
λi≥0
∑
u∈R
hu(λ)−
∑
i∈BL
λi (40)
where hu(λ) is the optimal solution of (37)-(39) for a given
λ. Given the prices λi, every sub-problem (37)-(39) can be
solved independently and optimally by router u using e.g. Eq.
(26). Problem (40) can be solved using a projected subgradient
method, similarly to Eq.(30)-(31), as discussed in [4]. Note,
however, that since x ∈ {0, 1} the dual problem is not always
guaranteed to converge to a primal feasible solution [7], [8].
Distributed vs. Centralized Solution. The above formulation
lends itself naturally to a distributed implementation. Each
router needs to only solve their own subproblem (37)-(39)
independently from the others. A single machine (e.g. the
victim’s gateway or a dedicated node) should solve the master
problem (40) to iteratively find the prices that coordinate all
subproblems. Thus, at every iteration of the subgradient, the
new λi’s need to be broadcasted to all routers. Given the λi’s,
the routes independently solve a sub-problem each and return
the computed x(u)p/l to the node in charge of the master problem.
Even in a centralized setting, our distributed scheme is efficient
because it lends itself to parallel computation of Eq.(32)-(34).
IV. PRACTICAL EVALUATION
The focus of this paper is the design of optimal and com-
putationally efficient algorithms for a variety of filter selection
problems. In this section, we use real blacklists to demonstrate
that filter optimization brings significant gain in practice. The
reason is that, in practice, malicious sources appear clustered
in the IP address space, a feature that is exploited by our
algorithms. Due to lack of space, the simulations presented
in this section are not exhaustive. However, they demonstrate
the above point as well as some of the structural properties
of the solution for BLOCK-ALL and BLOCK-SOME, which
are at the heart of this framework. As discussed in section
III, FLOODING is essentially an instance of BLOCK-SOME
for a particular assignment of weights and DIST-FLOODING
consists of several FLOODING problems.
A. Simulation Setup
We analyzed 61-days traces from Dshield.org [3] - a repos-
itory of firewall and intrusion detection logs from about 2,000
different organizations. The dataset includes 758,698,491 at-
tack reports, from 32,950,391 different IP sources. Each report
includes, among other things, the malicious source IP and the
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Fig. 4. BLOCK-ALL: collateral damage (CD) normalized over the number
of malicious sources N ) vs. number of filters Fmax. We compare Algorithm 1
to K-means. (In particular, we simulated Lloyd’s heuristic for K-means, which
is NP-hard; we ran 50 runs to avoid local minima.) We also run Algorithm 1
on two traces, those with the highest and lowest degree of clustering.
victim’s destination IP. By studying these logs, we verified that
malicious sources are clustered in a few prefixes, rather than
uniformly distributed over the IP space, which has also been
observed by others [9]. This is an important observation in
practice, because clustering in a blacklist means that a small
number of filters is sufficient to block most malicious IPs at
low collateral damage.
We looked at each victim (individual IP destination) in
the dataset; the set of sources attacking each victim is a
blacklist for our simulations. This “view” varies considerably
among victims. We also generated good traffic according
to a realistic scenario: a domain hosting 20 servers, each
server with average rate of 1,000 incoming good connections
per second, each connection generating 5KB of traffic. We
generated the good IP addresses according to the multifractal
distribution in [10].
B. Simulation Results
BLOCK-ALL. In Fig. 4, we chose two different victims,
each attacked by large number (up to 100,000) of malicious
IPs in a single day. We picked these particular two because
they have the highest and the lowest degree of attack source
clustering observed in the entire dataset. We ran Algorithm 1
on these two blacklists and made several observations. First,
the optimal algorithm performs significantly better than a
generic clustering algorithm that does not exploit the structure
of IP prefixes. In particular, it reduces the collateral damage
(CD) by up to 85% compared to K-means, when run on
the same (high-clustering) blacklist. Second, as expected,
the degree of clustering in a blacklist matters. The CD is
lowest (highest) in the blacklist with highest (lowest) degree
of clustering, respectively. Results obtained for other victim
destinations and days were similar and lied in between the
two extremes. A few thousands of filters were sufficient to
significantly reduce collateral damage (CD) in all cases.
BLOCK-SOME. In Fig.5, we focus on the blacklist with the
least clustering and thus the highest CD (dashed line in Fig.4).
In this worst case scenario, an alternative to BLOCK-ALL is
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considered a higher (214) and a lower (210) value of W .
BLOCK-SOME, which allows the operator to trade-off lower
CD for unblocked bad IPs (UBIP) by appropriately tuning
the weights. For simplicity, in Fig.5, we assigned the same
weights wg and wb to all good and bad sources; however, the
framework has the flexibility to assign weights to specific IPs.
In Fig.5(a), the CD is always smaller than the corresponding
CD in Fig.4; they become equal only when we block all bad
IPs. In Fig.5(b), we see that BLOCK-SOME reduces the CD
by 60% compared to BLOCK-ALL while leaving unblocked
only 10% of bad IPs and using only a few hundreds a filters,
In Fig.5(c), the total cost decreases as Fmax increases. As
defined in Eq.(12), this is the weighted sum of CD and UBIP.
However, the behavior of these two competing factors is more
complicated and depends strongly on the input blacklist. In the
data we analyzed we observed that CD tends to first increase
and then decrease with Fmax, while UBIP tends to decrease.6
The ratio wb/wg captures the effort made by BLOCK-SOME
to block all bad IPs and become similar to BLOCK-ALL.7
V. OUR WORK IN PERSPECTIVE
A. The Bigger Picture of Defense against Malicious Traffic
Dealing with malicious traffic is a hard problem that re-
quires the cooperation of several components. In this paper,
we did not propose a novel solution; instead, we optimized
the use of filtering - a mechanism that already exists on
the Internet today and is a necessary building block of any
6We can explain this as follows. When a new filter is available, the new
optimal solution can be constructed by (i) blocking a new cluster of bad
IPs (ii) splitting a blocked cluster into two filters or (iii) a combination of
(i)&(ii)& merging of existing filters. For small Fmax, option (i) is dominant:
the inherent clustering allows to find a cluster that is not blocked yet; this
increases CD and reduces UBIP. When this is not possible, option (ii) becomes
dominant, CD decreases and UBIP remains constant or decreases slowly.
7Since we picked a ratio wb/wg > 1, bad IPs are more important. When
Fmax is high, the algorithm first tries to cover small clusters or single bad
IPs. In the case of high W , this happens around 10, 000 filters: CD remains
almost constant in this phase, at the end of which all bad IPs are filtered (as
in Fig.5(b)). In the final phase, the algorithm releases single good IPs, which
are less important and all bad IPs are blocked similarly to BLOCK-ALL.
bigger solution. We focused on the optimal construction of
filtering rules, which can be then installed and propagated
by filtering protocols [11], [12]. We rely on a detection
module, e.g. an intrusion detection system or historical data,
to distinguish good from bad traffic and provide us with
a blacklist. Detection is a difficult but orthogonal problem
to the contribution of this paper. The sources of legitimate
traffic are also assumed known, for estimating the collateral
damage. Finally, we consider addresses in the blacklist to be
true and not spoofed. This is reasonable today that attackers
have the luxury to use botnets, and control a huge number
of infected hosts for a short period of time, so that they do
not even need to use spoofing. On 2005, less than 20% of
addresses were spoofable [13], while in 2008, only 7% of
addresses in Dshield logs were found likely spoofed [9]. Even
if there is some amount of spoofed traffic, our algorithms
treat it as the rest of malicious traffic and weight the cost
vs. the benefit of blocking a source prefix (which may include
both malicious spoofed and legitimate traffic). Looking into
the future, there is also a number of proposals promising
to enforce source accountability, including ingress filtering
[14], self-certifying addresses [15], packet passports [16]. To
the extent that spoofing interferes with the ability to define
blacklists, our algorithms work best together with an anti-
spoofing mechanism, but also do the best that can be done
today without it.
A practical deployment scenario is that of a single network
under the same administrative authority, such as an ISP or
campus network. The operator can use our algorithms to create
filtering rules, at a single or at several routers, in order to
optimize the use of its own resources and defend against an
attack in a cost-efficient way. Our distributed algorithm may
also prove useful, not only for a distributed protocol of routers
within the same ISP, but also in the future, when different
ISPs start cooperating against common enemies. In a different
context, our algorithms may also be applicable to configure
firewall rules to protect public-access networks, such as uni-
versity campus networks or web-hosting networks; although
firewalls are implemented in software, there is still an incentive
to minimize the number of their rules for performance reasons.
The following papers are related to our work. In [17], source
filtering via ACLs was studied against DDoS attacks; however,
the filters were heuristically selected and the approach was
entirely simulation-based. There is a body of work on firewall
rule configuration [18], which focuses on management and
misconfigurations, not on resource allocation. Furthermore,
they consider firewalls for enterprises, which are not supposed
to be accessed from outside and thus can be protected without
filtering rules. In our workshop paper [19], we also studied
optimal source-based filtering by aggregating source addresses
into continuous ranges (of numbers in [0, 232−1]) not prefixes.
This was an easier problem that allowed for greedy solutions.
Unfortunately, ranges are not implementable in ACLs; fur-
thermore, it is well-known that ranges cannot be efficiently
approximated by a combination of prefixes [5] . Therefore,
despite the intuition we gained in [19], we had to solve the
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problem of prefix filtering from scratch in this paper.
B. Relation to Knapsack Problems
The optimal filter selection belongs to the family of multi-
dimensional knapsack problems (dKP) [4]. The general dKP
problem is well-known to be NP-hard. The most relevant
variation to us is the knapsack with cardinality constraint
(1.5KP) [21], [22], which has d = 2 constraints, one of
them being a limit on the number of items:
∑
j∈N wjxj ≤
C,
∑
j∈N xj ≤ k. The 1.5KP problem is also NP-hard.
These classic problems do not consider correlation between
items. However, in filtering, the selection of an item (prefix)
voids the possibility to select other items (all overlapping
prefixes). dKP problems with correlation between items have
been studied in [23], [24], where the items were partitioned
into classes and up to one item per class was picked. In our
case, a class is the set of all prefixes covering a certain address.
Each item (prefix) can belong simultaneously to any number of
classes, from one class (/32 address) to all classes (/0 prefix).
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to tackle the
case where the items belong to classes that are not a partition
of the set of items.
Finally, continuous relaxations do not help. Allowing xp/l
to be fractional corresponds to rate-limiting of prefix p/l.
However, there is no advantage neither from a practical (rate
limiters are more expensive than ACLs, because in addition
to looking up packets in TCAM, they also require rate and
computation on the fast path) nor from a theoretical point of
view (the continuous 1.5KP is still NP-hard [25].)
In summary, the special structure of filtering problems, i.e.
the hierarchy and overlap of candidate prefixes, leads to novel
variations of dKP that could not be solved by existing methods.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced a formal framework to study
filtering problems. The framework is rooted at the theory of
the knapsack problem and provides a novel extension of it.
Within it, we formulated five practical problems, presented in
increasing order of complexity. For each problem, we designed
optimal algorithms that are also low-complexity (linear in
the input size) in practical scenarios. We also highlighted
connections between different problems: at the heart of all
problems lies BLOCK-SOME; BLOCK-ALL and FLOOD-
ING are special instances for specific assignment of weights,
and DIST-FLOODING decomposes into several independent
FLOODING problems. Finally, we did simulations using
Dshield traces; a key insight was that our algorithms can
exploit the spatial clustering that is inherent in real blacklists.
There are several directions for future work. We plan to ex-
tend the framework to dynamically update the filtering rules as
blacklists change over time, combine source- with destination-
based filtering, deal with adversarial scenarios, and study the
interaction between filtering and detection mechanisms. We
will also provide a more extensive experimental evaluation,
which is not the focus of this paper.
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